The Interrogation of Fritz Siebel
Then Major Siebel on the left speaking with Fieldmarshall Kesselring on December 11, 1940 on the deck of a heavy flak Siebelferry
In 1976 the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) declassified the 1947 interrogation of Colonel Siebel, former head of the Special Ferry Service. From 1945-1946, postwar interrogations of former German military personnel were largely focused on identifying war criminals and gathering evidence for trials. While war crime interrogations continued throughout 1947, there was a shift to collecting technical intelligence and historical data. This interview provides insight into the origins of the Siebel Ferry as developed for Operation Sealion, as well as later uses once that Operation was cancelled. Some of the transcript is available and is provided below without any edits to the original.
"By the middle of September 1940 this order was executed by making available for the crossing operations a total of 391 vessels with aerial propulsion, which were assembled in the harbors and channels of Holland and Belgium."
Operations in the Mediterranean of the Special Ferry Service
Parts I & II, and B 1, 3
May 1947
Author: Oberst Fritz W. Siebel
Personal: Oberstleutnant von Foerster
References: Report written from memory and with the aid of diaries.
Outline
I. Development of the Siebel Ferry and the Special Ferry Service
II. Functions of the Special Ferry Service
III. The Vessels included among the Special Ferry Service vessels operating in the Mediterranean
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The Siebel ferry was used as a transport, combat, and fuel supply ship.
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The infantry transport was used as a transport and repair ship.
IV. Particulars concerning the manufacturing process of the Siebel ferries and infantry transports
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Procurement of materials
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Construction facilities (dockyard, steel and machine construction)
V. Construction Sites in the Mediterranean
VI. Operations in the Mediterranean
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Africa
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Rommel Army (assembly at construction site in Africa)
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Hornet Army (assembly at construction site in Bari)
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Transportation of supplies to Tunisia (assembly at the Naples construction site)
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Evacuation of Sicily
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Transportation of supplies and evacuation of Sardinia, Corsica, and Elba; operations at the west coast of Italy
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Operations in the Adriatic Sea
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Operations in the Aegean Sea
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Preparations for the Crete Campaign
A.
I. Development of the Siebel Ferry and the Special Ferry Service
On 1 May 1940, Oberst d. R. Fritz W. Siebel was ordered to report for active duty to take charge in Northern France of an aircraft maintenance shop at the front.
At the end of June 1940, the commander of an adjacent engineer unit requested Oberst Siebel to let him have any of the aircraft gasoline tanks stored at the Potez aircraft plant, which were no longer serviceable or which had been captured. The engineers intended to use these tanks for the construction of rafts which were earmarked for the invasion of England.
Oberst Siebel was of the opinion that these tanks were not sufficiently strong for the contemplated purpose, and he complied with the request made by the engineer commander, to further follow up this matter, and to submit appropriate suggestions concerning the procurement of landing craft to the chief of supply of the Luftwaffe.
Consequently, in cooperation with Oberstleutnant Koch, with whom he discussed the matter, he submitted to the commanding general of the Luftwaffe, through the chief of supply of the Luftwaffe, the proposal to utilize BMW VI aircraft engines (BMW - manufactured by Bayerische Motorenwerke), which were available in large quantities and were no longer in use, to provide a new type of auxiliary vessel for the invasion of England. Type B pontoons and heavy bridge equipment type pontoons, which also were available in large numbers, were to constitute the floating parts. The suggestion was approved, and at the beginning of July 1940, Special Detachment Siebel (which subsequently was renamed Special Ferry Service) was organized within the command organization of the chief of supply of the Luftwaffe, and placed in charge of Oberst Siebel. The table of organization was the following: Two officers, one chief amphibious engineer, one inspector, and 480 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.
In order to avoid duplication of effort, an inquiry was first addressed to the naval operations staff, asking for further particulars concerning preparations they were making for the invasion. In reply, the chief of the competent department declared that no preparations whatsoever had been put into effect for the crossing. He stated the following: "If a year ago, there had been some indication of the now contemplated invasion of England, the Navy would have made some attempts in this direction."
It was the mission of the Special Ferry Service to construct in a few weeks large numbers of vessels which would be fairly fit for service, and would be able to travel from coast to coast without touching at any harbors. This war of production made it impossible for the completely overburdened war economy to undertake the manufacture of new landing vessels, and to adhere to production schedules; consequently, the Special Ferry Service advisedly made use of material which was at hand and no longer required for other purposes.
First, four type B half-pontoons were used to construct the "type B ferry" which was driven by one BMW VI aircraft engine with aerial propulsion. This ferry was able to carry either 50 infantrymen equipped with light and heavy weapons, or one 105mm howitzer, or one light tank; it operated, fully loaded, at a speed of eight knots, and was seaworthy as long as it traveled in a slight to moderate sea. In accordance with the naval operations staff and the engineers, 150 of this type of ferry immediately were constructed and in due time stored, ready for assembly, at St. Omer.
In view of the fact that the type B ferry was not capable of carrying heavy tanks, heavy guns, and large-size vehicles, a larger type of ferry was developed next, which had the same basic construction as the type B ferry, and subsequently became the so-called Siebel ferry. In this case, the floating parts were not the same as those of the type B ferry, but consisted of enclosed rectangular pontoons (each 2,10 meters long, 4,20 meters wide, and 1,80 meters high), made of 4mm sheet metal, which could be tied together to form a ship-type floating body which consisted of six individual pontoons plus front and rear ends (pontoons slanting to the front). Two of each floating parts, six meters apart, were connected by heavy iron beams and covered with corrugated planks, six centimeters thick. First, these were driven by aerial propulsion (three BMW VI engines) and later the same engines were pressed into service for water propulsion. Particulars concerning the Siebel ferry: It was 23 meters long and 14 meters wide; fully loaded the draught measured 1,200 meters, and it operated at a speed of eight knots. I refer to chapter A IV, part 1, concerning a more detailed description.
II. Functions of the Special Ferry Service
In July 1940, on the occasion of inspection of the model ferries, and the test runs held on Rangsdorfer Lake near Berlin, and at Emden, which were attended by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, General Halder, General Jakob, and General Udet, Oberst Siebel was instructed to leave no stone unturned to motorize as many vessels as possible for the crossing, and likewise to provide a large quantity of vessels similar to the model ferry. In this connection, he was promised complete support on the part of the engineers. By the middle of September 1940, this order was executed by making available for the crossing operations a total of 391 vessels with aerial propulsion, which were assembled in the harbors and channels of Holland and Belgium.
On 20 September 1940, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, accompanied by the members of his staff, inspected the Special Ferry Service at Antwerp, on which occasion he also witnessed the demonstration of a ferry which was armed with 88mm Flak. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was pleased with the results achieved by the Special Ferry Service. His remarks indicated that, although the invasion of England originally contemplated in the fall, had been postponed, the plan had not been given up. The Special Ferry Service were given instructions to continue the work which had been begun and to lay up a large number of Siebel ferries.
Operations in the Mediterranean of the Special Ferry Service
B II, 3 Transportation of supplies and evacuation of Sardinia, Corsica, and Elba; operations at the west coast of Italy during the period from 31 May 1943 to 31 December 1943.
Upon completion of the African campaign, three Siebel ferries, one Flak ferry (ferry equipped for Flak defense), and one infantry transport of the still remaining Siebel ferries and infantry transports were, after 31 May 1943, committed in Sardinia, in the harbor of Olbia (Terranova).
German forces on Sardinia were made up of the 190th Panzer Grenadier Division, elements of the Moelders Fighter Wing, and Flak units of regimental strength, as well as various attached batteries.
During that period, the provisioning of Sardinia for the most part was handled via Olbia harbor. One Luftwaffe supply depot was set up a few kilometers south of Olbia, and there was a naval ration supply depot near Palau, and an Army ration supply depot in the vicinity of the Olbia - Santa Teresa road. Olbia itself virtually had been cleared of all civilians, while public conveyances were no longer functioning, which also was the case throughout the northern part of the island. It was no longer possible to call on the harbor of Olbia, because of the ships which had been sunk by air attacks right at the pier. These attacks also had destroyed the harbor installations; no further clearance operations were effected. Consequently, the ships were anchored in a roadstead, while the lighterage was handled by the Siebel ferry, protected by the Flak ferry.
Besides this transportation by water, a daily supply service to Olbia by air was conducted by transportation units stationed at Naples.
Owing to the daily air attacks and the ever-increasing submarine menace, the shipping traffic of Olbia harbor was re-routed to the area formed by the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Maddelena, and Capera, which constituted one of the most important Italian defensive regions. This also put an end to the operations in the harbor of Olbia of the vessels of the Special Ferry Service. Beginning 19 June 1943, these vessels were stationed at Bonifacio on Corsica, from where they conducted the ferrying operations between Bonifacio and Santa Teresa. Additional Siebel ferries and infantry transports handled the lighterage at Palau (on Sardinia).
I am not in a position to offer any particulars concerning the achievements of the transportation service.
No vessels were lost.
II. B 2. The German forces on Corsica consisted of the SS Brigade "Reichsfuehrer SS", which, at first, was committed in the vicinity of Bastia, and then, during the summer, changed positions several times. Following the Badoglio coup, this brigade, in joint action with other German forces which had crossed over from Sardinia, and with the support of bombardment formations, occupied the city of Bastia, which the Italians defended with the aid of 16 batteries.
The supplies for Corsica as a rule were transported by sea from Livorno to Bastia. In addition to the naval tank landing draft, larger ships also were utilized for this transportation service. Transportation by air was limited, and was routed from Livorno, Pisa, and Florence to Borgo (airfield located 14 kilometers south of Bastia).
Except for one SS supply depot in the Aulene - Quenza area, there were no German food supply depots on Corsica. On the occasion of the evacuation of Sardinia, the naval supply depot located at Palau was transferred from there to Bonifacio, while at the beginning of August, a large food supply depot was transported by naval tank landing craft from Genoa and set up within a short time at Porto Vecchio, after a number of piers was constructed there.
The traffic on the island was handled by motor vehicles. The Bastia - Porto Vecchio railroad line, a narrow-gauge railroad, which ran once a day, was not used for transporting German supplies. After the Badoglio coup railroad traffic was suspended.
At first, there was but little ferrying traffic between Sardinia and Corsica via the Strait of Bonifacio. The distance between Bonifacio and Santa Teresa amounted to 10 sea miles. Not unitl some of the supplies for Sardinia were routed via Bastia did the ferrying traffic assume greater proportions.
After the Naples workshop had been dismantled and transferred to Port St. Louis (at the mouth of the Rhone River), the number of Siebel ferries and infantry transports committed at the Bonifacio and Maddelena was constantly on the increase. On 21 June 1943, three infantry transports and one repair ship (this was an infantry transport which had been equipped to function as a floating workshop) arrived in Olbia. However, of these, only one infantry transport remained at Olbia, at the disposal of the naval transportation center, while two vessels were transferred to Maddelena, and one repair ship moved to Bonifacio. On 8 July 1943, two Siebel ferries and four infantry transports arrived in Maddelena, where they were assigned to lighterage duties. On 14 July 1943, one Flak ferry and one Siebel ferry departed for Naples. On 12 August 1943, the Flak ferry returned to Bonifacio, and in days to come, was responsible for the protection of the Strait of Bonifacio, while the Siebel ferry was converted at Naples for use as a Flak ferry and assigned to service in the Strait of Messina. On 15 August 1943, two Siebel ferries and five infantry transports arrived at Bonifacio. The infantry transports were transferred to Maddelena. Consequently, the various vessels were committed as follows:
a. In Bonifacio - One Flak ferry, six Siebel ferries, one repair ship
b. In Maddelena - Twelve infantry transports
c. In Olbia - One infantry transport
Beginning with the end of July, the evacuation of Sardinia was started on a small scale. At the same time, two Siebel ferries which, until then, had been stationed at Maddelena, also were pressed into service for ferrying operations. Not until the Badoglio coup did the transportation problem become acute. Beginning 11 September, all vessels of the Special Ferry Service, including the infantry transports stationed at Maddelena, were committed for incessant day and night service between Palau and Bonifacio, regardless of prevailing weather conditions. The necessary engine repairs were taken care of while ferrying operations were going on. Leaks in the pontoons were plugged by means of empty canisters or tree trunks. The Flak ferry was in charge of protecting the Strait of Bonifacio. By 18 September 1943, the evacuation of Sardinia had been completed, and all troops with their weapons and equipment ferried across to Corsica (Bonifacio). The pursuing enemy forces at that time had reached Palau.
Available figures concerning the achievements of the Siebel ferries and infantry transports in the Strait of Bonifacio cover only the period up to 10 September 1943. Up to that time these vessels handled the following:
4,388 soldiers 3,600 canisters of gasoline
11,525 tons of equipment 4,500 containers of oil
967 tons of ammunition 670 cubic meters of fuel
306,000 rounds of carbine ammunition 252 cases of hand grenades
7,298 75mm shells 24 guns
327 mortar shells 12 field kitchens
After that date, no further records were kept concerning the transportation performances of the ferry service. However, during the period from 11 to 18 September 1943, the entire 190th Panzer Grenadier Division, as well as the chief of anti-aircraft forces on Sardinia, along with armament and equipment, were transported from Sardinia to Corsica.
The only Italian units transported from Sardinia to Corsica were those of the "Membo" Parachute Division, who crossed on an Italian ferry. This detachment disarmed the crew of the Bonifacio fortress, and a short while later was transferred to Italy.
During the entire operation one infantry transport was lost. On 9 September 1943, while crossing over from Maddelena to Palau, this vessel was attacked by Italian batteries of various calibers up to approximately 88mm, and sunk. The crew, swimming in the water, was fired upon with machine guns.
Two Italian submarines, which still were operating up to the time of the Badoglio coup, were demolished by the German Navy, because, owing to the lack of personnel, it was impossible to transfer these ships.
It is noteworthy that beginning with the middle of July 1943, the young male population left their villages to join the Maquis (underground movment). These elements were provided by air with weapons, ammunition, and supplies from America, and also were furnished with Italian tanks and artillery. The partisans raided the SS hospital located near Quenza in the center of the island, and looted the SS food supply depot.
III. On the morning of 18 September 1943, all Siebel ferries and infantry transports were transferred from Bonifacio via Porto Vecchio to Bastia, from where, reinforced by Siebel ferries and infantry transports which had been used for operations in Sicily, and in conjunction with naval vessels - mostly tank landing craft - they continued the evacuation of Corsica, which already had started. The ferry service functioned between Bastia and Livorno and Bastia and Piombino, and in some instances, in order to gain time, the vessels for a while also went to Porto Ferraio (on Elba). Traveling between Bastia and Livorno, it was necessary to cover a distance of 67 nautical miles, while the distance between Bastia and Piombino amounted to 48 nautical miles. The Siebel ferries operated without escort, and in conjunction with infantry transports, traveled between Corsica and Italy.
On 21 September, at 1315 hours, while the evacuation of Corsica was under way, a heavy air attack was launched on the harbor of Bastia, during which several transports caught fire, and which caused serious damage and conflagrations in the city proper. During the night of 22 September 1943, from 0340 to 0430 hours, another heavy air attack on the city and harbor caused considerable more damage than the preceding attack. At the same time, enemy submarine activity was intensified. For instance, on 24 September 1943, the transport "Champagne", a reconverted 10,000 ton tanker (which, however, was able to hold only 80 to 90 motor vehicles owing to the lack of between decks), while still docked in Bastia harbor, was slightly damaged by a torpedo. In days to follow, other torpedos detonated in the harbor, without, however, causing any damage. On 27 September 1943, the transport "Champagne" which, unprotected, was beached outside the harbor, was torpedoed once more and rendered unnavigable, after it had been under steam for 36 hours, and had failed to sail for lack of convoy guards. On 25 and 28 September 1943, at about 1400 hours, air attacks were launched on the Borgo airfield which was not occupied.
Towards the end of September, Bastia was the only city in Corsica still in German hands. On 30 September 1943, the city outskirts already were under fire from machine guns and mortars; however, we succeeded in driving the enemy forces (Moroccan troops) back to the mountains. On the evening of 3 October 1943, the evacuation of Corsica came to an end with the loading on a Siebel ferry of the last 88mm Flak battery which, that very afternoon, still had been engaged in ground fighting. Beginning at 1700 hours, Bastia harbor was under constant bombardment by heavy mortars which, however, did not cause any damage. By then, the enemy had entered the city. The German ships in the roadstead provided protection for the last Siebel ferry. Approximately 50 motor vehicles were left behind.
I have no information concerning the transportation records achieved by the Siebel ferries and infantry transports during the evacuation of Corsica.
The figures are somewhat lower than these covering their operations in the Strait of Bonifacio.
In spite of air and torpedo attacks, the Special Ferry Service lost no vessels on water. One Siebel ferry which, in spite of leaking pontoons, was over-loaded by the Navy, sank while en route from Bastia to Livorno; no lives were lost. During the air attack on Bastia harbor, which took place on 22 September 1943, as described above, two Siebel ferries were destroyed by bomb hits.
Operations on Sardinia and Corsica were particularly handicapped by the lack of spare parts for ferries and infantry transports, which were impossible to obtain on Sardinia or Corsica; even the procurement of oxygen and carbide was connected with considerable difficulties. This was further complicated by the fact that road conditions on Sardinia were extremely poor. Not until 26 August 1943 did any appreciable amounts of spare parts arrive in Bonifacio. That alone made it possible to complete the evacuation of Sardinia, which was handled exclusively by the vessels of the Special Ferry Service.
Moreover, the unhealthy climate on Sardinia, and particularly the southern tip of Corsica, which was a notorious malaria region, caused numerous malaria cases among the troops.
IV. After the evacuation of Corsica had been concluded on 31 October 1943, all vessels, totaling 11 Siebel ferries and about 39 infantry transports, were assigned to transporting supplies to Elba and outposts along the Italian coast from Piombino to San Remo.
For the moment, there were no German troops on Elba or any defensive installations which might have interfered with an enemy landing. Generally, such fortifications, constructed on a small scale and temporary basis, consisted of nothing but barbed wire entanglements. The old-model Italian guns on Elba as a rule were manned by Italian volunteers who, only just recently, had received insufficient training.
After the Badoglio coup, all outpost duty ceased along the west coast of Italy. Thus, by the beginning of October, the Italian speedboats in the harbor of Piombino had not yet resumed operations.
I am not able to cite any figures concerning the supplies transported to Elba; however, in keeping with the small garrison on the island, the amount was inconsiderable.
On 15 October 1943, two Flak ferries were set on fire while engaged in night combat in the Strait of Piombino with enemy gunboats superior to them in number, armament, and speed. The day before, these Flak ferries had received orders concerning departure and position from the 6th Security Division; these orders were transmitted by telephone from Livorno to Piombino, and in some instances, Italian circuits were pressed into service.
In anticipation of a new assignment, which was considered likely, all infantry transports in Piombino were pulled ashore for general overhauling by means of a mobile slip which had been repaired by the Special Ferry Service. This made it possible, at the end of December 1943, when the order was given to dismantle, to load all infantry transports on railroad cars at Genoa, to make them available for new commitments in the Adriatic and Aegean Sea respectively. The remaining nine Siebel ferries were taken apart at Port St. Louis, loaded on railroad cars, and overhauled at Antwerp; subsequently, they were assigned to new operations in the Adriatic and Aegean Sea.
Thus, the operations of the Special Ferry Service in this part of the Mediterranean came to an end on 31 December 1943.
(signed): Fritz Siebel
Garmisch, 18 June 1947